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The
Early Years |
The
Early Years ‘Operation
Sealion’ During July 1940, the Germans began assembling hundreds of barges in the French and Dutch coastal ports, including Calais, Rotterdam, Le Havre and Antwerp, in preparation for the invasion of Britain. As RAF Fighter Command fought off the Luftwaffe’s attempts to dominate the skies over the Channel and Southern England, Bomber Command repeatedly attacked the invasion barges and also attacked enemy air bases, fuel supplies and aircraft factories to try to undermine the Luftwaffe. This combined effort forced the Germans to postpone their attack, but the cost was heavy: Although their role is largely unrecognised, even more RAF bomber crews than fighter pilots had been killed during the Battle of Britain.
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| The Blitz begins The Germans invasion plan had failed. Instead they began their night-time ‘Blitz’ on London and other British cities including Coventry, Glasgow, Plymouth, Bristol and Birmingham. The Germans also increased U-boat (submarine) attacks on Britain’s vital supply routes from America of food, fuel and military equipment, causing terrible losses to merchant shipping and threatening to cut off the British Isles.
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Bombers target ships and subs Churchill was so worried by these losses that in March 1941 he ordered Bomber Command to concentrate on attacking German submarine bases and factories. Together with Coastal Command the bombers also continued to attack German shipping. The battle-cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were bombed in Brest and were unable to join the Bismarck, severely hampering the German Navy’s attacks on British shipping. Low-flying bombers were also used to lay mines at sea and this proved increasingly successful at sinking German ships as the war went on, though it was a hazardous operation for the bomber aircrews. Light bombers such as Blenheims regularly launched extremely dangerous low-level daylight missions against German shipping.
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Bomber Command in crisis Since the British army’s retreat from Dunkirk in May/June 1940, Bomber Command had become Britain’s most potent offensive weapon. From the summer of 1940, the RAF was launching raids on Germany at night, though the bomber force was still relatively small and under-equipped. The primary targets were oil facilities and communications (e.g. railways) though as a secondary target Bomber Command was also told to attack German cities ‘for their intrinsic industrial and psychological value’ on nights when conditions prevented identification of the primary target. This became known as ‘area bombing’. In the summer of 1941 a survey of bombing accuracy over Germany at night revealed that just 30% of bombers found their way to within even five miles of specific targets. The main difficulties were flying in darkness, bad weather and primitive navigation aids. This shocking news dashed Churchill’s high hopes for the success of bombing. He later noted that bombing could not be more than a ‘heavy …and increasing annoyance’ to the enemy. In the autumn of 1941 the decision was taken by Air Ministry planners to switch the order of target priority: Area bombing was to be the first priority. Precision raids would be carried out when conditions or circumstances allowed. The plan was endorsed by Churchill, but over the winter of 1941 the Command was ordered to reduce operations to conserve forces for the following year. The bomber force needed more aircrews, bigger bombers and better navigation equipment if it was to have any real effect on Germany.
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New aircraft, new commander Early 1942 was the turning point for Bomber Command, with the arrival of new four-engine bombers, such as the Lancaster, more advanced navigational aids and a new commander. Air Marshal Arthur Harris had a reputation as a blunt, unapproachable man that belied his true character. He was a strong leader much respected by his men and had a deep understanding of bomber aircraft and the difficulties his aircrews endured.
Harris had no involvement in the development of the new policy and did not personally believe in the strategy of targeting civilian morale, with, as he later put it ‘the Gestapo standing by’ and ‘the concentration camp around the corner’. But he did believe in targeting Germany’s war economy by destroying German industrial cities so that her ability to wage war would be compromised.
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Harris’ great gamble Harris knew that the bombing campaign had been in crisis and that Bomber Command needed a success. He proposed to take a daring but calculated risk. On 30th May he scraped together every last available plane, including training aircraft, and sent 1,000 bombers on a huge night raid to Cologne. Had it gone wrong, Bomber Command’s campaign could have been finished. But the German defences were overwhelmed by the seemingly endless waves of bombers and the first Thousand Bomber Raid was a huge success. The aircrews’ morale soared as did confidence in Bomber Command. Another two 1,000 bomber raids quickly followed and Harris’ Bomber Offensive had begun.
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